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Abstract — Ongoing power system automaton and open access 
imposed by new government deregulations aggravate cyber-
vulnerability of utility computer networks. This paper proposes 
an open-access-compatibility (OAC) security layer, installed 
beneath the data-link layer of the popular utility network 
protocol DNP3, to enhance data transmission security for utilities 
with open access capabilities. The OAC security is designed as an 
extension for a Canadian utility integrated P&C system 
innovation. The OAC security increases interactions with DNP3 
data-link layer to enhance utility network security that is 
especially important for time-data-critical transmissions of 
protection information. The OAC security does not alter existing 
DNP3 specification to maintain interoperability for devices not 
using OAC. The OAC security uses two independent encryptions, 
one for exchanging security keys and one for transmitting data, 
to minimize time required for security operations. The OAC 
security relaxes authentication requirements to reduce 
transmission overheads and increase efficiency.  
 
Index Terms--Computer networks, Computer network 
management, Computer network security, Power system 
communication, Power system security, Protocols, Security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper proposes an open-access-compatibility (OAC) 
security layer for DNP3, a popular North American utility 
computer network protocol [1], providing confidentiality and 
authentication. The OAC security layer is designed to operate 
beneath the data-link layer of DNP3 but to avoid alterations to 
the existing DNP3 specification. The OAC security layer 
optimizes the data transmission security design by utilizing 
the existing DNP3 protocol stack to provide the required 
communication capability. The OAC security layer is derived 
from the cyber-security for DNP3 previously presented in [2] 
based on Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [3][4]. However the 
transmissions of time-critical protection data could be delayed 
unnecessarily by the previously presented PGP-based 
security. 
There are broad demands for power system utilities to 
adopt cyber-security [5]-[8], especially for the recent power-
system operating environment with increased automation and 
government-imposed open access. The ongoing power system 
automation increases the number of devices connected in the 
utility computer network to enhance the power system 
operations, but this may create vulnerable locations from 
                                                          
T. Mander and F. Nabhani are with University of Teesside, U.K. 
L. Wang and R. Cheung are with Ryerson University, Canada. 
 
which the utility can be attacked. For example, the use of 
networked smart meters in the distribution system can 
facilitate various functions of metering such as recording time 
and attribute of electricity use, but the networked meters 
could produce security cracks for cyber-attacks. The power 
system automation also increases the use of devices with 
sophisticated communication capabilities such as exchanging 
data amongst themselves and with devices of external 
networks that can facilitate power system operations. 
However, increased data exchanges with devices of external 
networks in a peer-to-peer (P2P) networking could aggravate 
the opportunities for cyber-attackers to manipulate data that 
may cause power system devices malfunction or even failure. 
Access to utility networks from external networks for 
electricity generation and trading transactions, due to 
government-imposed open access requirements, increases the 
number of users who are allowed to access the utility network 
through the Internet where not long ago, only trained utility 
staff had access to the utility network. This has considerably 
aggravated the risks into proper power system operations. For 
example, a cyber-attacker, through a compromised external 
access to the utility network, may send multiple DNP3 “stop” 
application function codes to strategic power system locations 
that could cause a wide-area blackout [9]. Previously no 
specific security was required for DNP3 since only a small 
number of trained staff had access to the utility network. Due 
to recent power system open-access operations, DNP3 has to 
have certain security measures such as encryption and 
authentication. Currently DNP3 does not specify data 
transmission security, except when it is used over TCP/IP that 
could cause cyber-security vulnerabilities for utility networks 
using DNP3 [10]-[13]. Plans for implementing authentication 
security for DNP3 has recently been proposed [14]. 
This paper presents the OAC security layer with open 
access compatibility for DNP3 using specific encryption and 
authentication without the need of altering the existing DNP3 
specification. The OAC security layer is designed to be 
located beneath the DNP3 data-link layer. This security 
provides increased transparency to the DNP3 protocol stack 
with no change to the existing DNP3 specification. This 
security layer is designed to be interoperable with existing 
DNP3 devices of not using the OAC security. This permits a 
smooth phase-in for the OAC security layer implementation, 
as a smooth transition is usually required for live power 
systems. In addition, this security layer utilizes the 
communication capability of the DNP3 protocol stack for 
simplifying the security operations, i.e. the OAC security 
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layer does not need to implement fragmentation, as otherwise 
it would be required for TLS [12]. 
The cyber-security for DNP3 was previously proposed to 
use PGP as a basis by the authors [2]. The cyber-security 
operated in two modes, one for public key cryptography 
(PGP-based security mode) and one for symmetric 
cryptography (symmetric-only security mode). The PGP-
based security mode was used as a symmetric key exchange 
mechanism in which the symmetric key and authentication 
information was appended onto the DNP3 frame. However, 
the use of the PGP-based security for protection data would 
delay the data transmission unacceptably for proper power 
system protecting operations, because the PGP-based security 
mode is much time intensive than the symmetric-only cipher 
mode. Since the cyber-security of [2] was transparent to 
DNP3, there was no coordination between the cyber-security 
and the DNP3 protocol stack. Instead, the cyber-security of 
[2] could reduce potentials of delaying time-critical data by 
minimizing the use of the PGP-based security. 
This paper proposes an enhancement to the cyber-security 
of [2] by ensuring that time-critical transmissions of 
protection or control data are not delayed by the public key 
cryptography. The OAC security layer proposed in this paper 
provides a security enhancement against replay attacks and 
increases the number of cyber-security features. The OAC 
security is capable of implementing secure communications 
for wide-areas, such as with the two-level hierarchical 
controller structure used for power system stability [15]. 
II.  ENCRYPTION AND AUTHENTICATION 
Encryption and authentication are the security measures for 
the development of the OAC security layer in this paper. 
Encryption provides confidentiality while authentication 
provides data transmission integrity. Without confidentiality, 
attackers could read the data passed between devices within 
the network. For example, a cyber-attacker could read a 
password used for DNP3 file transfers [9], and use that 
password to download files from a device or alter files on that 
device. Encryption can use either symmetric ciphers (single 
key cryptography) or asymmetric ciphers (public key 
cryptography). The symmetric ciphers are much fast in 
comparison to asymmetric ciphers and therefore are more 
suitable for the real-time security operations. However, the 
symmetric key ciphers do not have the authentication 
capability of the asymmetric ciphers and keys are difficult to 
exchange securely. Therefore, there are cipher schemes in 
which a hybrid approach is taken, such as with PGP where 
symmetric encryption is used for the data and asymmetric 
encryption is used for a security header. The asymmetric 
ciphers may be used as a mechanism to securely exchange 
symmetric cipher keys such as was used with TLS [12] and 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [13][16]. 
Without authentication, the destination processor could not 
determine the integrity of data transmissions. The data 
transmission integrity requires the integrity of the data and the 
integrity of the source device. The data integrity will indicate 
if the transmitted data has been manipulated. For example 
without the data integrity, a cyber-attacker could alter a DNP3 
stop application command from a single application to all 
devices by altering the qualifier code [9]. A message digest 
may be used to create the authentication, such as MD5 or 
SHA-1. However, it may still be possible for a cyber-attacker 
to manipulate a data-link frame while maintaining a correct 
value for the message digest. Security implementations, such 
as TLS and Ipsec, use HMAC that provides stronger 
authentication [12][13][17]. The source integrity 
authenticates the source device to the destination device. 
Without source integrity, an attacker could masquerade as 
another device that has permission to alter the destination 
device settings, such as stopping an application or causing the 
device to restart. The strong source integrity can be achieved 
through the non-repudiation capability of the asymmetric 
cryptography. 
III.  OAC SECURITY LAYER ENCRYPTION  
A.  Encryption Modes 
Two encryptions of asymmetric and symmetric modes are 
considered in the design of the OAC security layer proposed 
in this paper. The asymmetric mode is used to securely 
exchange symmetric cipher keys between two devices while 
the symmetric mode is used for the encryption of the typical 
DNP3 data transmissions such as protection, control, and 
monitoring data. The two modes are basically independent of 
each other except for the asymmetric mode being used to 
update the symmetric mode’s cipher key. Each DNP3 peer 
connection has its own asymmetric and symmetric modes that 
they are independent from other peer connections. Therefore 
each connection has its own set of asymmetric keys (source 
private and public keys, and destination public key) that are 
only valid for that connection plus the symmetric mode 
symmetric cipher key that is only valid for data transmissions 
to a particular destination. 
Since asymmetric encryption is considerably slow in 
comparison to symmetric encryption, the asymmetric mode is 
used only for cipher key exchanges in a format similar to 
PGP. However, the asymmetric mode is unable to transmit 
empty frames containing the new symmetric cipher keys since 
the OAC security layer does not introduce any further 
communication capability to DNP3, but relies on the current 
DNP3 communication capability. Therefore, the asymmetric 
mode must use a DNP3 data-link layer frame to communicate 
the new symmetric cipher keys. For example, if the 
asymmetric mode data transmission was corrupted during 
transmission, the OAC security layer does not have the 
communication capability to detect and handle this situation. 
However, the DNP3 protocol layers would have the time-out 
timers to determine if a data transmission has not been 
responded and have the capability to retransmit the data. 
The asymmetric mode cannot be used with the application 
layer message fragments, since this would delay transmissions 
of time-critical protection and control data, as well as non- 
time-critical monitoring data. However, the data-link layer 
function codes link status request and the responding link 
status can be used for the asymmetric mode data 
transmissions since they do not convey typical DNP3 
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protection, control, and monitoring data [18]. The link status 
request is transmitted from a network master or an outstation 
as a greeting message confirming that the link is still 
responding. The destination for the link status request 
responds with a link status message, confirming that the link 
is still working. Importantly, the link status request and the 
link status function code data transmissions do not contain 
important state information such as the transport layer or 
application layer sequence numbers. As a consequence, the 
asymmetric mode is not under a time-constraint in which to 
process and transmit the data-link frame containing these 
function codes. The asymmetric mode therefore does not 
interfere with processing and transmission of time-critical 
protection data using the symmetric mode.  
Using the link status request function code data 
transmissions as the transport mechanism for the asymmetric 
mode requires increased interaction between the OAC 
security layer and the data-link layer. The asymmetric mode 
must be able to control the usage of the link status request 
function code, allowing the asymmetric mode to convey 
security when required. For example, the security layer cannot 
allow the data-link layer to begin a time-out timer until the 
data transmission had been processed and transmitted by the 
security layer [18]. The symmetric mode is used for all DNP3 
data transmissions except for the link status request data 
transmissions. Therefore there is minimal processing and 
overhead for the control, protection, and monitoring data. 
Since there is one symmetric cipher key per link direction that 
is independent of each other, i.e. cipher key x used from the 
master to the outstation and cipher key y from the outstation 
to the master, the mechanism for exchanging symmetric 
ciphers keys is minimized. The OAC security layer does not 
dictate the cipher or cipher key size to be used for the 
symmetric operations, which is dependent on the desired 
security levels by the user.  
B.  Asymmetric Mode 
There are two states for the asymmetric mode: active and 
inactive, as shown in Fig.1. The asymmetric mode is in the 
active state when it is transmitting symmetric cipher keys to 
the destination node. When the asymmetric mode is in the 
inactive state, it is not transmitting any data. 
 
 
Active 
 
Inactive 
if Response = false 
if Response = true 
then Counter = 0 if Counter >= Max  
then Response = false 
if Counter < Max 
then Counter++ 
 
Fig. 1. Asymmetric mode state machine 
In Fig.1, the asymmetric mode remains in the active state 
until it receives a link status response from the destination 
device. When the link status response to the link status 
request is received the state machine enters the inactive state. 
The state machine relies on the DNP request-response 
operations for the link status request function code. Once the 
DNP3 data-link layer has entered a link status wait state, it 
will remain in that state until it receives a response from the 
destination, or until the number of retries has exceeded the 
specified limit [18]. If the source device receives a link status 
function code response from the destination, the destination 
was therefore able to decrypt the data transmission correctly 
and receive the new symmetric cipher key. At this point, the 
transmitted symmetric key becomes the new cipher key used 
for the symmetric mode. 
Once the asymmetric mode has entered the inactive state, it 
will remain in the inactive state for a specified number of data 
transmissions to the destination device. The specified number 
of data transmissions is a defined parameter for a particular 
peer connection and depends on the security confidence level 
for a particular link. Data transmissions occurring within a 
facility LAN would transition into the asymmetric encryption 
state rarely to replace the symmetric cipher keys since 
security risks are lower. Long-distance links between devices 
would have more exposure to cyber-attackers and would 
therefore have the symmetric cipher keys for that connection 
replaced more frequently.  
The asymmetric mode active state operations are completed 
in three stages: symmetric encryption, frame authentication, 
and asymmetric encryption. 
Stage 1: Symmetric Encryption 
The symmetric encryption coverage of the data-link layer 
frame header is limited due to DNP3 P2P capabilities. The 
P2P networking requires that the source address field be 
transmitted in the clear (unencrypted) in order to allow the 
destination device to use the source address to look-up the 
cipher keys used for the connection. Since the source address 
cannot be encrypted, all header fields prior to the source 
address field cannot be encrypted either. The symmetric 
encryption can therefore only be applied to the Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) field in the data-link layer header 
block, as shown in Fig.2. This figure shows that the start 
(Start), length (Len), control (Ctrl), destination address 
(Dest), and source address (Source) header fields are in the 
clear while the CRC field is encrypted. Fig.2 also shows the 
optional authentication data block, discussed in Section IV for 
the authentication modes, that is appended onto the data-link 
layer frame that is also encrypted. 
Start Len Ctrl Dest Source CRC Optional
Authentication
Data
Unencrypted Data Encrypted Data  
Fig. 2. Symmetric encryption of the DNP3 data-link layer frame for the 
asymmetric mode active state. 
Stage 2: Frame Authentication 
Typically the message authentication may be calculated 
only for the data encrypted by the symmetric cipher. However 
since most of the data-link layer header is in the clear, the 
message authentication must include the entire data-link 
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frame. If the authentication were not extended to the entire 
frame, attackers would be able to alter the header, such as the 
function codes causing errors, i.e. altering an ACK to a 
NACK, without being detected by the OAC security layer. 
Importantly, the asymmetric encryption mode uses the more 
secure encrypt-then-authenticate operation. The OAC security 
layer does not place constraints on the message 
authentication, although HMAC provides better 
authentication than simply using a message digest. The 
message digest coverage is shown in Fig. 3. The encrypted 
data consists of the header block CRC and possibly 
authentication data that is discussed in Section IV. 
Start Len Ctrl Dest Source Encrypted Data
Authenticated Data  
Fig. 3. Authentication coverage of encrypted DNP3 data-link layer frame for 
the asymmetric mode active state. 
Stage 3 Asymmetric Encryption: 
The asymmetric encryption operations firstly create a 
security header which is then encrypted using the asymmetric 
ciphers. The encrypted security header is then placed into the 
data-link layer frame. Fig. 4 shows the security header for the 
asymmetric mode.  
Control Sequence
Number
Authentication Cipher
Key
 
Fig. 4. Asymmetric mode security header. 
The security header is composed of the following fields: 
control, sequence number, authentication, and cipher key. 
Control: This field provides parameters to the OAC security 
layer for handling received data transmissions. The control 
field is shown in Fig.5 with the following fields: use key, 
authentication mode, and random padding. The use key field 
indicates if the received asymmetric mode frame’s symmetric 
cipher key is to be used to replace the current symmetric 
cipher key. Otherwise the frame is used for conveying 
authentication mode information discussed in Section IV, 
which is indicated by the authentication mode field. The 
random padding is used for the interoperability operations 
discussed in Section V. 
Use Key Authentication
Mode
Random
Padding
 
Fig. 5. Security header control field options. 
Sequence number: used to provide security against replay 
attacks. DNP3 has inherent security against replay attacks due 
to the transport layer and application layer sequence numbers. 
If the received data transmission does not have the expected 
sequence numbers, the data will be discarded. Since the 
transport layer and the application layer have different sizes 
for the sequence number space [9],[19], having a data 
transmission that matches both sets of sequence numbers is 
less likely. However, the asymmetric mode itself is vulnerable 
to replay attacks without the sequence number since an 
attacker could cause the destination to accept new symmetric 
cipher keys. The sequence numbers and the symmetric mode 
provide security against this type of replay attack. 
Authentication: contains the authentication generated from 
the encrypted data-link layer frame in stage 2. This field is 
variable depending on the type of message authentication 
used. 
Cipher key: provides the symmetric cipher key used on the 
data from stage 1. If the control field’s use key parameter is 
set, the cipher key field also provides the new symmetric 
cipher for the symmetric mode operations. 
Once the security header has been generated and encrypted 
using the asymmetric cipher keys, the security header is 
placed into the data-link frame shown in Fig. 6. The security 
header is inserted into the data-link layer header after the start 
field since the start field may be used in the physical layer as a 
frame delimiter. 
Start Encrypted
Security
Header
Len Ctrl Dest Source Encrypted
Data
 
Fig. 6. Encrypted security header location within data-link layer frame. 
C.  Symmetric Mode 
The symmetric mode is used for all DNP3 data 
transmissions except for the link status request and link status 
function codes data transmissions. The symmetric mode data 
transmissions to the destination are not delayed by the 
asymmetric mode operations if the data-link layer is not in the 
link status request states. However, once the data-link layer 
has entered the states associated with the link status request, 
further symmetric mode data transmissions would not be 
possible until a link status response is received [18]. Since 
decryption of the asymmetric mode data transmissions are 
time-intensive, time-critical data transmissions would be 
unduly delayed by this state condition. Therefore in order to 
remedy this condition, where time-critical data would be 
delayed unduly, further implementation changes are required 
to the DNP3 data-link layer by allowing user data to be 
transmitted and received while in this state.  
Since the symmetric mode is independent on each side of 
the link, the symmetric key states required for the symmetric 
mode are simplified. For data transmissions from a device to 
the destination the current symmetric key is always used since 
it will only be updated by the asymmetric mode when it 
becomes valid to the destination (the active to inactive 
transition shown in Fig. 1). However, the destination uses two 
symmetric mode states for received data transmissions: 
current key and new key. The current key state is used for the 
symmetric mode decryption operations and contains the 
current valid symmetric key. The new key state contains the 
next symmetric cipher key that will be valid, and which was 
obtained from the last received asymmetric mode data 
transmission used to update the symmetric key. Due to the 
time-delays associated with the request-response operations of 
the asymmetric mode, and possibly due to transmission errors, 
it is not possible to precisely determine when the new key will 
be used by the source to the destination, requiring the 
symmetric encryption mode states at the destination shown in 
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Fig. 7 which is used to determine which symmetric key is to 
be used on the received data transmissions.  
In Fig. 7, the symmetric mode remains in the current key 
state until the decryption operations using the current 
symmetric cipher key detects a transmission error, which is 
determined from the header CRC value. If a transmission 
error is detected, the symmetric mode will transition to the 
new key state. The data transmission will then be decrypted 
using the new symmetric cipher key from the last correctly 
received asymmetric mode data transmission. If a data 
transmission error is still detected, the symmetric mode will 
transition back to the current key state without any 
modifications to the states. This case represents a corrupted 
data transmission. If no data transmission errors are detected 
with the use of the new symmetric cipher key, the symmetric 
mode transitions back to the current key state, setting the new 
cipher key as the current cipher key.  
New
Key
Decryption
error
No decryption errors,
current key = new key
Current
Key
 
Fig. 7. Symmetric mode states at the destination. 
The symmetric encryption operations are the same as those 
performed for the asymmetric mode. The symmetric 
encryption is performed on the CRC field in the header block 
and the user data blocks, shown in Fig. 8. The symmetric 
encryption does not include most of the data-link header since 
the source address must be in the clear due to the P2P 
networking. The symmetric mode authentication discussed in 
Section IV has the same coverage as the asymmetric mode 
shown in Fig.3. The symmetric encryption uses the more 
secure encrypt-then-authenticate operation than what was 
proposed in [2]. The symmetric mode does not insert the 
authentication into the data-link frame, discussed in Section 
IV, in order to increase the transmission efficiency of the 
DNP3 control, protection, and monitoring data transmissions. 
Start Len Ctrl Dest Source CRC User Data
Blocks
Unencrypted Data Encrypted Data  
Fig. 8. Symmetric mode encryption coverage 
IV.  OAC SECURITY LAYER AUTHENTICATION 
A.  Authentication Modes 
Authentication operations generate additional data that is 
appended onto data transmissions. As a result, data takes 
longer to transmit, which may cause unacceptable delays in 
time-critical protection data transmissions, such as those 
dealing with wide-area power system stability discussed in 
[15]. Therefore in order to improve the efficiency of the OAC 
security layer, the symmetric mode does not include the frame 
authentication with its data transmissions. The addition of 
authentication to the asymmetric mode security header does 
not degrade the asymmetric mode transmission efficiency 
since the encrypted security header will be the same size 
regardless if the authentication data was included or not due 
to the larger block sizes used by the asymmetric ciphers.  
The OAC security layer symmetric mode authentication is 
performed after the data has been encrypted. The 
authentication therefore uses the more desirable encrypt-then-
authenticate for all data transmissions, which requires the 
authentication to be transmitted separately from the frame 
being authenticated in any case. The OAC security layer uses 
the trust-me-until-proven-otherwise format for the symmetric 
mode security. Since the symmetric encryption, which has the 
cipher keys properly authenticated using the asymmetric 
mode, and the user data block CRCs should provide sufficient 
authentication for most cases, including explicit frame 
authentication within the symmetric mode data transmission 
using HMAC or message digest is redundant. The OAC 
security layer therefore provides two authentication modes for 
the symmetric mode that are used to provide authentication 
between the source and destination devices, which are: 
standard and enhanced modes. The standard mode, which is 
discussed in the next subsection, provides flexibility and is 
used for limited bandwidth cases. The enhanced 
authentication mode requires higher bandwidth but provides 
stronger security and is discussed in the subsection following 
the standard authentication mode subsection. 
B.  Standard Authentication Mode 
In the standard authentication mode, the authentications 
generated by the symmetric mode are stored as DNP3 data 
that can be retrieved by the destination device to confirm the 
integrity of the data as necessary. The authentications are 
generated on a data-link layer frame basis. Therefore, the 
transport layer sequence numbers [19] are used to reference 
the authentications. However, since the transport layer 
sequence number space is very small, with only 64 numbers 
[19], the authentications have to be accessed within a very 
short period of time before they are over written by the new 
authentication values. Transmitting all of the authentications 
referenced by the transport layer sequence number may be 
difficult for devices with low bandwidths depending on the 
size of the message authentication used. Since the OAC 
security layer assumes that the data integrity is high, even 
without the authentication being included within the data 
transmission, not all authentications would be required to 
confirm the ongoing integrity of data transmissions. Instead, a 
random sampling of the authentications can be taken by the 
destination to confirm the overall integrity of the data 
transmissions, with the sample size dependent on the 
bandwidth constraints for transmitting the authentications. 
C.  Enhanced Authentication Mode 
In the enhanced authentication mode, the authentications 
generated by the symmetric mode are transmitted with the 
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asymmetric mode data transmissions. Using the asymmetric 
mode as the transport mechanism for the symmetric 
authentications increases the symmetric mode authentication 
security. The asymmetric mode operations will include the 
authentication of the encrypted authentications in the security 
header, thereby providing full data integrity for that data 
transmission as well as non-repudiation. Although the 
enhanced authentication mode provides increased security for 
transmitting the symmetric mode authentications, it requires 
increased processing and transmission performance. With the 
symmetric authentication values referenced by the transport 
layer sequence numbers, the sequence space is very small 
with only 64 numbers [19]. Therefore, the asymmetric mode 
has to process and transmit the authentications within this 
time period before the authentication numbers are over-
written as was the case for the standard authentication mode. 
The small sequence space for the transport layer sequence 
numbers will require the generation of asymmetric mode data 
transmissions on a more frequent basis than what would 
typically be required for the replacement of the symmetric 
cipher keys. Therefore, the key used parameter of the security 
header control field can be used to indicate if the current 
symmetric encryption key should be replaced with the 
currently received symmetric cipher key or if it was used for 
the current data transmission only. The enhanced 
authentication mode requires that the OAC security layer 
header control field parameter authentication mode be set. 
This indicates that the data following the header CRC are a 
list of symmetric mode authentications.  
As with the standard authentication mode, the enhanced 
authentication mode only uses a random sampling of 
symmetric authentications to minimize the amount of data 
being transmitted. Unlike the standard authentication mode, 
the enhanced authentication mode does not provide error 
control and recovery. The asymmetric mode generates an 
entirely new link status request data transmission with a new 
symmetric encryption key. Therefore, new asymmetric mode 
data transmissions would contain an entirely different 
sampling of symmetric mode authentications each time a new 
data transmission was generated. 
V.  INTEROPERABILITY 
An important requirement for the OAC security layer is 
interoperability between devices that use and do not use the 
OAC security layer. In addition, the OAC security layer must 
be able to detect which encryption security mode is being 
used for received data transmissions. The interoperability 
operations are divided into two steps: determination of 
asymmetric mode and determination of symmetric mode. 
A.  Determination of the Asymmetric Mode 
The determination if the asymmetric mode has been used 
on the data transmission can be obtained from calculating the 
CRC-16 for the first 8 octets of the data-link layer frame 
header. If the calculated CRC-16 is equal to the received data-
link layer header CRC-16 value in location octet 9 and 10, 
then asymmetric encryption was not used on the frame. If the 
CRC values do not match then either the asymmetric mode 
was used or a data transmission error has occurred. 
Determining if a data transmission error has occurred can 
be decided from applying the asymmetric mode operations 
and using the message authentication to check for errors. 
However, this is a time consuming process, especially for 
noisy environments where there would be a greater tendency 
towards transmission errors. Therefore, a more efficient 
determination of the asymmetric mode can be used based on 
the size of the data transmission. Since the asymmetric mode 
increases the size of the data transmission close to the 
maximum size of a DNP3 data-link layer frame, the enhanced 
authentication mode will increase the frame size beyond the 
maximum size. Therefore frames greater than the maximum 
size used the OAC security layer. If the standard 
authentication mode is used, padding can be added into the 
data-link frame to increase its size to value greater than the 
maximum data-link layer frame size. The padding is added 
after the asymmetric operations and appended after the 
security header. The padding is removed by the destination 
after it has determined that the standard authentication mode 
has been used from the authentication mode parameter in the 
OAC security layer header control field.  
This more efficient check determines if security has been 
used on the frame, but not which security mode. The 
symmetric mode may also increase the frame size beyond the 
maximum DNP3 data-link frame size. Therefore, the amount 
of authentications added by the enhanced authentication mode 
or the amount of padding added into the frame for the 
standard authentication mode have to exceed the maximum 
frame size increase by the symmetric mode as well. 
Otherwise, the asymmetric mode authentication will have to 
be used to determine if a data transmission error occurred. It 
is possible for the encrypted security header to create 
matching calculated and received CRC values for the 
asymmetric mode encryption operations. Therefore, the 
source device must test for this condition. If matching CRC 
values are discovered for an asymmetric mode data 
transmission, the random padding parameter in the security 
header control field is altered to remove this condition. This is 
a performance improvement over [2] which has the symmetric 
key altered, and hence the authentication as well, to correct 
this condition. 
B.  Determination of the Symmetric Mode 
Determining if the symmetric mode has been used can be 
obtained from calculating the CRC-16 for the header and 
matching it to the received CRC-16, as discussed for 
determining the asymmetric mode. If the CRC is match, then 
the source address can be used to determine if the OAC 
security is used for the peer connection. If encryption keys 
exist for the connection, then security was used and therefore 
the frame has used the symmetric mode. Otherwise, no 
security was used on the frame, and it can be sent directly to 
the DNP3 data-link layer. The OAC security layer requires 
that once security is used for a peer connection, it will be 
always used. Therefore, if a data transmission is received on a 
connection that uses the OAC security but the frame has not 
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used the OAC security, it will be rendered indecipherable by 
the OAC security layer to the data-link layer of DNP3 since 
the symmetric mode will be applied regardless. This increases 
the security against manufactured frames sent into the DNP3 
network for a connection that is using the OAC security. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
The ongoing power system utility automaton and open-
access under government imposed deregulation is increasing 
the cyber-vulnerabilities of utility computer networks. This 
paper has proposed the OAC security layer with open-access 
compatibility, located beneath the data-link layer, to provide 
the popular utility network protocol DNP3 with strong data 
transmission security under open access deregulated power 
system environment. The OAC security layer does not require 
alterations to the existing DNP3 specification, in order to 
provide interoperability capability with devices of not using 
the OAC security. The OAC security layer requires increased 
interaction with the DNP3 data-link layer for controlling the 
security operations. The increased interaction with the data-
link layer enhances the performance of the OAC security 
layer, which is especially important for the transmission of 
time-critical protection data. 
The OAC security was originally designed for increasing 
the reliability level for time-data-critical transmissions of 
protection information, as an extension for a Canadian utility 
integrated P&C system innovation. This paper has described 
the OAC security design. Two encryptions of asymmetric and 
symmetric modes have been considered in the design of the 
OAC security layer. The asymmetric mode, which is used to 
exchange symmetric cipher keys, is independent of the 
symmetric mode, which is used for control, protection, and 
monitoring data transmissions. The asymmetric mode 
operations are therefore unable to cause data transmission 
delays for the data using the symmetric mode. The symmetric 
mode therefore minimizes the OAC security layer’s impact on 
the data transmission timing for time-critical protection data. 
To further enhance the performance of the OAC security 
layer, the symmetric mode authentication is omitted from the 
data transmissions. The authentications are either accessed 
from the device as DNP3 data or appended onto the 
asymmetric mode data transmissions. With this trust-me-until-
proven otherwise format, the overhead of transmitting 
authentications with the symmetric mode data transmissions is 
eliminated, which can drastically increase the size of the 
frame. As a result, time-critical data transmissions are 
transmitted and received quicker by the DNP3 devices since 
there is less data being transmitted.  
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